Honolulu 02/04 agenda

Coordinating Regional Strategies for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula

A Multilateral Workshop
part of the Building Six-Party Capacity project

February 20, 2004
Halekulani Hotel
Honolulu, Hawaii

Agenda

Welcome and Introduction

Session 1: Evaluating the Multilateral Approach to the North Korean Challenge
To discuss and evaluate from a regional perspective the past approaches and the current state of negotiations with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons and related programs. The key objective of this session is to illuminate the current process, the motivations/priorities of participants, and the potential obstacles to success in preparation for afternoon sessions that will focus on the future course of policy coordination.

• Current state of the six-party talks: where are we now? What have we learned?
• Do we understand any more about North Korea’s motivations and intentions for WMD development? How do we evaluate the DPRK’s WMD capability? How does North Korea view the six-party talks?
• What are the strengths, weaknesses, and options with regard to the six-party process? Are factions developing among the six parties that could impede progress (or that could be used to an advantage by one or more parties)?
• Is KEDO destined to dissolve? Can we apply lessons from KEDO going forward?
• What have we learned to date (and how successful have we been) regarding the ability to align diverse regional priorities on WMD and broader weapons proliferation?
• Where are the positive keystones upon which further six-party progress might be achieved? What are the limits of Beijing’s leverage on Pyongyang? Is there a larger role for Moscow? How can Washington make a phased approach more viable and acceptable to all?
• What are the implications for weapons proliferation of a prolonged stalemate or collapse of the talks?

Session 2: The North Korean WMD Problem in a Global/Regional Context
To explore recent non-proliferation developments around the world and the potential linkages between them. The goal here is to consider possible new ideas for applicability to the North Korean WMD problem with regard to inducement (to conclude an agreement on WMD program dismantlement), enforcement (of such an agreement), and/or containment (should efforts fail).

• Is the world moving into a new era of proliferation challenges that requires different policy approaches and forms of cooperation and containment? What have we learned on different non-proliferation fronts (e.g., Libya, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan), and how do they fit together in a global and regional context?
• What are the specific implications of the moves by Libya to dismantle its WMD programs? Does this development signify success (in discouraging a would-be nuclear power) or underscore failure (in that current non-proliferation mechanisms couldn’t stop Libya from developing this far)?
• What more can the UN and the IAEA do to stem WMD proliferation? How do the countries in East Asia evaluate recent proposals by the IAEA and others to “multilateralize” the nuclear fuel cycle or have the IAEA (or a third party or consortium) act as an intermediate supplier of nuclear fuel?
• What are the regional reactions to President Bush’s recent proposals regarding new measures for countering WMD (see fact sheet in back cover of briefing book)? What are the regional reactions to the recent draft resolution regarding weapons proliferation being circulated among the permanent five (P5) members of the UN?
• Should we build upon the NPT, MTCR, CWC, and other agreements in a global fashion or try to adapt and augment the non-proliferation regime in a regionally specific way and, if so, how?
• What does all of this mean in the context of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? Are there opportunities to link these issues to the broader North-South reconciliation process so as to facilitate a non-nuclear, unified Korea in the future?

Luncheon / Discussion (Report on North Korean Economic Reforms)

Session 3 Coordinating Strategies for Addressing North Korean Security Concerns and Economic Needs
To discuss forward-looking, Korea-specific policy approaches that provide local incentives to keep the peninsula WMD-free. This session will take into account the discussions from the morning and combine our collective expertise to tease out areas of agreement and disagreement with regard to future policies, and to highlight more promising blends of carrots and sticks. The next two sessions will certainly touch on strategies for next week’s six-party talks, but we hope to look further into the future, as well.

• What is the proper balance of carrots and sticks for achieving a WMD-free Korean Peninsula (or a nuclear-free zone including Japan) in the short and long term?
• What form of security guarantee for North Korea is appropriate, acceptable, and workable?
• What of the North’s obligations under the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? Can that be utilized in some way?
• Is some form of “Partnership for Peace” for North Korea possible or advisable? Or are there other ways to promote stability and assurance, perhaps CBMs such as the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement or similar stabilizing measures from the East European experience?
• On the economic front, what can the parties do to promote some level of economic reform in North Korea (e.g., the creation of economic zones – such as Kaesong – along/near the borders with the ROK, China, and Russia)? Can assistance be provided in a way that pays longer-term benefits in support of North-South reconciliation?
• How can other, non-nuclear issues (e.g., missiles or chemical/biological weapons) be incorporated into the process? Can still other important issues (e.g., human rights or Japanese abductees) not directly tied to proliferation concerns also be included in the process and, if so, how?
• What are the potential “minefields” that we should be preparing for along the way (e.g., nuclear incident in the North, additional DPRK missile launches, nuclear weapons test, transfer of weapons-grade material from Pyongyang to a third party), and how would they affect the carrot-and-stick balance?

Session 4 Coordinating Regional Strategies for Verification and Enforcement of a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula
To examine practical methods of verifying and enforcing an arrangement that leads to a WMD-free Korean Peninsula or, failing that, a method of containing the ramifications of a nuclear North Korea.

• Assuming an agreement can be reached with North Korea, what are the most promising options for creating a verification regime for a WMD-free Korean peninsula? Should we utilize existing structures (e.g., the IAEA), or modified international approaches (e.g., the UN P5 and/or the six-party participants), or something purely Korean, such as the dormant South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission?
• What can we draw from the recent disagreement between the IAEA and the United States and U.K. regarding inspections in Libya (and the final compromise)?
• Can an export control regime be tied into a multilateral WMD inspection/monitoring process?
• Should the six parties fail to reach an accord, are there circumstances under which the region could “tolerate” a nuclear North Korea? What kind of nuclear North Korea (if any) might key powers be willing to co-exist with, and how could the potential incentives for further proliferation be contained?
• Are there new challenges, roles, and missions for regional militaries in combating emerging/future proliferation risks? How can we best collaborate in the areas of counter-proliferation and WMD-related counterterrorism?
• Is the PSI a start in this direction, a risky feint, or a misunderstood step? Should the ROK, Russia, and China join the PSI in some manner?
• Is the six-party talks process potentially much bigger than the North Korean nuclear issue? Are there, in this multilateral process, roots of permanency? Could it lead to a structured organization, or possibly just a new inclusive, multilateral environment or approach to security in the region? Can new, joint security missions lead to new security architecture? Or does the order have to be reversed?