Shanghai 03/03 Agenda

Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula
A Multilateral Workshop

part of the Building Six-Party Capacity project

March 17, 2005
Radisson Plaza Xing Guo Hotel Shanghai
Shanghai, China

Agenda

Welcome and Introduction

Plenary
Session 1: The Viability of a Capacity-Building Effort
We are all aware of the debilitating effect that the lack of trust has upon the effort to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and we have witnessed past attempts to rid the peninsula of nuclear weapons collapse under the weight of suspicion, ambivalence, and misunderstandings. There has been a consistent problem getting from “the deal” to “the details” of implementation, but the six-party process could offer a way to help avoid the failures of the past.

Some have argued that the six-party framework might provide a more convincing security assurance for North Korea than previous attempts, and that it could also help convince the United States that the North can be held more accountable for potential shortcomings in compliance with agreements covering nuclear dismantlement and verification. Considering this from the perspective of actual implementation, a key question becomes how the six-party group can contribute constructively to these (and related) challenges, and what does this imply for the manner in which the six-party group organizes itself?

Framing the viability question: brief introduction by IFPA moderator, followed by group discussion. Key questions include:

• Overall, what is the most appropriate role for the six-party group during the implementation of an agreement? What is the proper balance between what is desirable and achievable, between being an active designer and manager of the process versus providing more passive oversight and serving as a mechanism for dispute resolution?
• Can a capacity-building effort be launched in such a way that it could win support in the six countries? How are the different country delegations likely to view this idea?
• What is the potential role for the DPRK, and how can it be encouraged to participate in a constructive manner? What incentives and assurances (in terms of the scope and/or limitations of the six-party role) does DPRK need to view this effort in a positive light?
• What are general conditions under which this effort has the best chance for success? How can we best dispel or address concerns and foster a positive and optimistic attitude among the other five countries and the DPRK?

Plenary
Session 2: The Basic Approach for a Capacity-Building Effort
The proper approach for this effort depends a great deal on the substance of the previous discussion. A very proactive six-party group (think in terms of a KEDO-like organization for verification, economic engagement, and dispute resolution) could require a substantial organization, technical expertise, and a funding stream. A more passive stance might only require oversight committees that receive reports from other entities (e.g., IAEA, WFP, or individual countries) and then step in to help settle disputes or coordinate aid efforts.

• What kind of approach or framework might work best for the six parties? What forms of leadership and oversight might be both acceptable and successful?
• How do you shift from developing a framework to making it operational? Should there be general goals or specific guidelines by which to measure progress and avoid misdirection of effort?
• What are lessons learned from other organizational approaches in Asia or Europe?
• Should all countries be members of all subcommittees, or is it better to divide up? Are there general roles or specific tasks that certain countries are uniquely qualified to perform? Do all questions require decisions by unanimous consent, or are some issues better left to the decisions of sub-groups (e.g., the U.S., Japan, and South Korea with regard to energy and economic assistance) and even individual countries?
• To what extent are the prospects for North-South reconciliation and reunification and for development of a new regional security architecture relevant to the process?

Luncheon / Panel Discussion: The Current State and Near-term Prospects of/Strategy for Continuing the Xix-party Talks. Opening comments by Amb. Ning Fukui, followed by a panel discussion led by others involved in the talks.

Breakout Sessions: Small Group Discussions on Key Negotiating Areas
These small groups will allow more focused discussion on the broader themes raised in the morning as they apply specifically to the different negotiating areas. We are looking to identify overarching principles in each area that can help guide future project research, which will develop more specific proposals that can be debated at the next multilateral workshop in 2006.

• Security assurances
• Dismantlement and verification
• Economic engagement

Plenary
Session 3: Reports from the Breakout Groups and Wrap-up Discussion
A designated reporter for each group will briefly summarize the key points of discussion and agreement in the breakout sessions. We will need to leave time to debate as a group the potential inconsistencies in approach and discuss what the day’s events have revealed with regard to a way forward on the capacity-building effort.

Concluding Dinner for All Participants